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The BSP’s Monetary Policy Reaction Function  
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This paper attempts to provide an empirical determination of the 
Philippine central bank’s (BSP) recent monetary policy stance, before and 
after its adoption of the inflation targeting framework, as revealed by its 
interest  rate  setting  behavior.  Employing  Clarida,  Galí,  and  Gertler’s 
(1998, 2000) forward-looking model, it finds that the BSP has indeed been 
stabilizing inflation by and large through its key policy rate, though it 
appears to be accommodative with respect to the output gap. In addition, 
currency stability and expansionary money supply (M1) growth are other 
concerns of the BSP, though significantly so only in earlier periods. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The  Bangko  Sentral  ng  Pilipinas  (BSP)  has  traditionally  conducted  monetary 
policy by targeting monetary aggregates in line with its mandated duty of maintaining 
price  stability  that  is  conducive  to  economic  growth.  This  approach  of  controlling 
inflation  through  the  appropriate  tweaking  of  money  supply  growth  is  based  on  the 
Quantity  Theory  of  Money  (QTM)  and  was  essentially  part  of  the  Philippine 
government’s  loan  program  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  However, 
starting the second semester of 1995, it adopted a so-called “modified framework” that 
attempted to “complement[ing] monetary aggregate targeting with some form of inflation 
targeting, placing greater emphasis on price stability in lieu of rigidly maintaining the 
intermediate monetary targets” (Guinigundo, 2000). This new framework allowed base 
money to exceed target as long as inflation targets were met, with mopping up operations 
done if and when inflation eventually overshot target
1. 
 
Monetary policy took another turn in January 2000 when the Monetary Board 
(MB),  the  BSP’s  policy-making  body,  adopted  in  principle  the  shift  to  an  inflation 
targeting  framework,  formally  adopting  it  two  years  later.  This  move  was  largely 
prompted by the apparent success of many central banks in attaining low inflation after 
adopting such a framework
2, and as such seen as the new best practice. The approach 
                                                 
1 While one reason offered for the adoption of this approach was the supposed weakening of the 
relationship underlying monetary aggregate targeting, it is apparent that the BSP in effect took a passive 
monetary stance during the time this framework was in place. 
2  Introduced  in  New  Zealand  in 1990 and  later  on  adopted  in  Australia,  Brazil,  Canada,  Chile, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. The United States, Germany, and Japan are also 
largely seen as practicing inflation targeting, and even before this approach was labeled as such.   3 
essentially entailed announcing an explicit inflation target, either a point or an interval, 
and  setting  a  monetary  policy  instrument  consistent  with  achieving  that  target  given 
inflation forecasts and other relevant information. Moreover, this is accompanied with a 
high degree of transparency and accountability, as the central bank is expected to explain 




The sustained regime of low inflation and relatively more stable growth in major 
economies has fueled academic interest in the empirical assessment of the behavior of 
monetary policy. This traces the central bank’s commitment and aggressiveness to fight 
inflation to the setting of its key policy rate. We attempt here to do such an assessment 
for  the  Philippine  setting,  investigating  whether  the  BSP’s  monetary  policy  can  be 
modeled empirically by assuming that the BSP has been targeting inflation through the 
overnight  reverse  repurchase  (RRP)  rate,  and  whether  it  is  primarily  concerned  with 
fluctuations in inflation and output, much like in studies done in developed countries. 
Further, we hope to understand how the changes in the policy framework adopted by the 
BSP were rendered in practice.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology we employ 
and  some  notes  on  the  estimation  of  monetary  policy  reaction  functions.  Section  3 
introduces the data used and discusses some preliminary observations. Section 4 proceeds 
with the estimation of the baseline specification and its extensions and then an analysis of 




2  The model 
 
Following  Clarida,  Galí,  and  Gertler  (1998,  2000),  we  cast  the  processes 
underlying monetary policy in a “rule” context where the central bank sets every period a 
policy  variable 
* r ,  in  most  cases  the  interbank  lending  rate  for  overnight  loans,  to 
influence  inflation  p ,  dependent  on  the  deviations  of  expected  inflation  from  target 
* p and of expected output from trend 
* y : 
 
  [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )
* * * | | t t n t t m t t m r r E E y y b p p g + + + = + W - + W - ,  (1) 
 
where  t W  denotes the information set available at time t,  E  denotes the expectation 
operator, n and m are the forecast horizons for inflation and output respectively, and r  is 
the desired nominal rate of interest that is expected to prevail when inflation and output 
                                                 
3 Svensson (2001) puts out three criteria indicative of genuine inflation targeting: (1) a clear mandate 
for a monetary policy directed towards low inflation, (2) central bank independence, and (3) accountability 
of the central bank for achieving the mandate. The BSP broadly meets these criteria: the first two are 
explicit  provisions  in  the  New  Central  Bank  Act  of 1993,  while the  third one  has  been  demonstrated 
starting 2002 with the BSP’s publication of the minutes of the monthly MB meetings, quarterly Inflation 
Reports and a yearly Open Letter to the President.   4 
are at their target levels. We impose a forward-looking specification, i.e. n, m  ³ 0, and 
thus allow the central bank’s decisions to be based on its beliefs about contemporaneous 




Many  theoretical  models  justify  the  use  of  such  a  specification,  and  is  most 
plausible for an economy with temporary nominal wage and price rigidities and a central 
bank that has a quadratic loss function over inflation and output. We postulate that the 
nominal  rigidities  result  in  a  short-run  output-inflation  tradeoff  that  the  central  bank 
addresses by stabilizing both inflation and output. 
 
Note that we can rearrange (1) to get 
 
  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )
* * * 1 | | t t n t t m t t m rr rr E E y y b p p g + + + = + - W - + W - ,  (2) 
 
where  [ ]
* | t t t n t rr r E p + = - W  is the ex ante real interest rate target
5 and 
* rr r p = -  is the 
long-run equilibrium real interest rate. This equation puts the policy rule in a real context, 
and thus translates to a determination of whether policies made in the nominal domain are 
effective. Since lower (resp. higher) real interest rates stimulate (resp. stifle) output and 
inflation, the monetary stance on deviations of inflation from target and of output from 
trend depends on the signs of  b  and g , in which case it is patently stabilizing if  b  > 1 
and g  > 0 and accommodating otherwise.  
 
The central bank is assumed to smooth interest rates, probably to minimize the 
disruption of capital markets, to insulate against charges of policy reversals that would 
erode its credibility, or to build consensus in support of policy changes. This gradualist 
tendency is modeled by allowing the policy rate to adjust partially to target: 
 
  ( )
*
1 1 t t t t r r r r r n - = - + + ,  (3) 
 
where  t n   is  a  zero  mean  exogenous  interest  rate  shock  and  r   is  the  smoothing 
parameter. 
 
Letting  ( )
* 1 rr a b p = - -  and 
* ˆt t t y y y º - , we insert (1) in (3) and get 
   
  [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) { } 1 ˆ (1 ) | | t t n t t m t t t r E E y r r a b p g r n + + - = - + W + W + + .  (4) 
                                                 
4 In contrast, the so-called Taylor (1993) rule, popularized by its ability to track rather closely the 
nominal Federal funds rate since 1979, uses the first lags of inflation and the output gap. Note that if lagged 
values  of  inflation  and  the  output  gap,  or  a  linear  combination  of  these,  are  sufficient  statistics  for 
forecasting its future values, then such a backward-looking specification would result in similar parameter 
estimates. 
5 This is an approximate measure since the maturity of the short-term policy rate may be different 
from the forecast horizon used on expected inflation.   5 
Now assuming rational expectations, we come up with 
 
  { } 1 ˆ (1 ) t t n t m t t r y r r a bp g r e + + - = - + + + + ,  (5) 
 
where  [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) { } ˆ ˆ (1 ) | | t t n t n t t m t m t t E y E y e r b p p g n + + + + = - - - W + - W + . Letting  t u  be a 
vector of variables that belong to the information set  t W  at the time the central bank 
chooses the interest rate, such as lagged values of inflation, the output gap, exchange rate, 
commodity prices, and interest rates, we estimate  [ ] , , , a b g r  in (5) using Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) on the orthogonality condition  
 
  [ ] | 0 t t E e = u .  (6) 
 
Since other variables may affect the target rule, independent of the information 
they contain about inflation and output, we may augment (5) with  t q z q +  within the braces 
and add lagged values of z in the instrument list. In this paper, we already include the 
lagged values of z in the instrument list even before its inclusion in the specification 
because  we  deem  that  a  bigger  information  set  would  enrich  the  estimation,  barring 
problems with imposing too many moment restrictions. 
 
 
3  Data and preliminary observations 
 
The overnight RRP rate series was obtained from the Department of Economic 
Research (DER) of the BSP. Gaps in the series prompted a limited sample length of just 
twelve years; we attempted to compensate for this with increased data frequency by using 
monthly observations from January 1991 to December 2003. 
 
The data on quarterly real gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, money supply 
(M1),  average  nominal  peso-dollar  exchange  rate  (PhP/US$),  and  the  real  effective 
exchange  rate  (REER)  index  were  obtained  from  the  Institute  for  Development  and 
Econometric Analysis (IDEA), Inc., which archived it from publications of the National 
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). Real GDP was seasonally adjusted using the U.S. 
Census X11 procedure (additive seasonal components), and then its trend was unmasked 
by the Hodrick-Prescott filter, using the suggested smoothing parameter for quarterly 
data
6. The two resulting quarterly output measures were converted to monthly data by 
fitting a quadratic polynomial to every three adjacent points of each series (two for the 
endpoints) and then by matching the sums of the three months that correspond to the 
                                                 
6 The Hodrick-Prescott (1999) filter, though widely used, is a centered smoothing estimator that 
exhibits end-point problems (Taylor, 1999); we attempt to remedy the problem at the starting endpoint by 
extending the real GDP series back to 1981:01.   6 
relevant quarter
7. Upon conversion, the percentage log difference was considered as the 
output gap. Inflation was computed from the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
 
The Federal funds rate series was culled from the US Federal Reserve website 
while monthly averages of Dubai crude oil spot prices were in turn obtained from the 
World Bank website. In the specifications, percentage changes were used, monthly for 
the exchange rate and crude import price measures and yearly for the money supply. To 
better mirror sustained changes in the monetary aggregate, we employ the three-month 













Looking at the historical picture of inflation, the output gap, and the overnight 
RRP rate from 1992 to 2003 in Figure 1, we indeed see attempts at reining in on inflation 
via overnight RRP rate adjustments in as much as overnight RRP rate hikes precede 
inflationary easing, similar to those observed in the G3. We also see such a hike in mid-
1997, coincident with a significant positive output gap; however, this hike was more 
likely a reaction to the nominal currency depreciation that triggered the Asian financial 
crisis rather than a proactive response to anticipated inflation brought about by sustained 
economic growth prior to the crisis. Otherwise, we don’t see much positive association 
between output gap and overnight RRP rate movements; indeed, their sample correlation 
is -0.2387 compared to 0.5126 for the other pair. For inflation at least, this graph lends 
some confidence on the acceptability of our assumption regarding interest rate targeting 
even as the BSP started adopting such a framework only in 2000. This assumes of course 
                                                 
7 This has the effect of smoothing the series within quarters, ignoring the possibility of a monthly 
seasonal character of GDP. We do not have viable alternatives for obtaining monthly output however. The 
problem with industrial production, the closest measure, is that it does not take into account the country’s 
larger service and agriculture sectors, aside from having just been recently made available.   7 
that monetary policy has indeed been stabilizing, although the casual evidence here is that 
the BSP has been accommodating the output gap. 
 
We also observe that there is considerable persistence in the overnight RRP rate 
series, notably most recently, with significant deviations brought back soon enough to a 
seeming  underlying  trend,  justifying  our  adoption  of  a  partial  adjustment  model  of 
interest rate targeting. 
 
In Table 1 we have the descriptive statistics of these three series across the whole 
sample and the three sub-periods that we now define: period I runs from 1992:01 to 
1995:06, period II from 1996:07 to 1999:12, and period III from 2000:01 to 2003:09. 
Note that the two breakpoints correspond to the introduction of the “modified” monetary 
framework and the adoption in principle of the inflation targeting framework; we assume 
that  the  BSP  has  already  been  practicing  inflation  targeting  even  before  its  formal 
adoption in January 2002. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Sample:  I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III
Mean 11.92 15.26 12.06 8.65 6.73 7.76 8.03 4.21 -0.36 -1.56 0.44 -0.19
Median 10.88 13.97 12.05 8.35 6.68 7.55 8.02 3.64 -0.51 -1.78 0.32 -0.17
Maximum 34.41 34.41 25.72 15.00 11.54 10.64 11.54 6.93 3.30 0.72 3.30 2.12
Minimum 6.75 8.31 7.30 6.75 2.50 5.88 3.94 2.50 -2.99 -2.68 -2.99 -1.59
Std. Dev. 4.74 6.17 2.90 2.04 2.47 1.24 2.25 1.50 1.55 0.86 1.84 0.79
Skewness 1.99 1.33 1.84 1.35 0.01 0.29 -0.04 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.03 0.98
Kurtosis 8.51 4.54 10.35 4.38 2.05 2.11 1.56 1.95 2.79 2.61 1.74 4.67
Observations 141 42 54 45 141 42 54 45 141 42 54 45
Overnight RRP rate Inflation Output Gap
 
 
We see that the average overnight RRP rate has been declining over the three sub-
periods along with decreasing variability, while average inflation marginally went up in 
period II, accompanied by a surge in variability, before dramatically falling in period III. 
In turn, the average output gap has been significantly negative in period I and slightly 
negative in period III, which improved to moderate positive territory in period II with 
more than twice the variability as the other periods. 
 
One criterion we will use in evaluating the appropriate forecast horizon and the 
plausibility of different specifications would be the implied inflation rate target. We can 
uniquely identify it from the constant term a  in (5) by finding a proxy for the long-run 
equilibrium real interest rate  rr . We use the sample average of the difference between 
the 91-day Treasury bill rate and the inflation rate prevailing three months later for this 
purpose, equal to 4.69% from 1992:01 to 2003:09. Note in Figure 2 that the monthly 
series of this proxy variable has been rather volatile, and furthermore, we have but a short 
sample. Judging from Figure 1, we expect the implied target inflation rate to be below 
6.73%, the sample mean of inflation.   8 
We feature in the four panels of Figure 3 the movements of the instruments used 
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   9 
Before  we  go  on  to  the  empirical  estimation  of  the  monetary  policy  reaction 
function, we point out two issues that affect the reliability of the results. First is that we 
assume here that the inflation and overnight RRP rate series are stationary, thus shunning 
away spurious results that can possibly be brought by their being cointegrated or by 
plainly having unit roots. However, because of the persistence of both series, we find 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests that both have 
unit roots. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) encounter the same problem but brush it 
aside, arguing that unit root tests have low power anyway. We follow the same. 
 
Second, the output gap and inflation series must exhibit sufficient variation within 
the sample, and that this sample period must be long enough. We see from Table 1 that 
the output gap is not as volatile as inflation and that volatility decreases for both in 
periods I and III. While we cannot have the luxury of having a long sample due to the 
missing  values  in  the  overnight  RRP  rate  series  before  the  1990s,  we  note  that  de 
Brouwer and Gilbert (2003) used a sample with 70 points, half as many as ours, and still 
got plausible results, though the difference is that they used quarterly data. 
 
Having  disclosed  these  caveats  on  the  confidence  we  can  attribute  to  our 




4  Estimation results and analysis 
 
The empirical analysis begins with the estimation of the baseline specification 
over the whole sample; we do this for different forecast horizons. Using the chosen target 
profile, we then check for subsample stability of the parameter estimates. We then test if 
the  specification  we  use  is  significantly  different  from  a  backward-looking  one. 
Afterwards,  we  ascertain  the  plausibility  of  other  variables  significantly  entering  the 
reaction function, specifically with regards to movements in the money supply and the 
exchange rate. 
 
We estimate the parameter vector 
*, , , p b g r ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ using the two-step nonlinear two-
stage least squares estimator (Hansen, 1982), where the initial parameter estimates from 
traditional two-stage least squares are used to form a consistent estimate of the optimal 
weighting  matrix,  which  is  then  used  to  iterate  the  coefficients  to  convergence.  We 
specified  a  quadratic  spectral  kernel  to  weigh  the  covariances  and  Andrews’  (1991) 
method for bandwidth selection. A convergence tolerance of 1 x 10
-5 was imposed. 
 
We used the first to sixth, ninth, and twelfth lags of our instrument list, composed 
of  the  overnight  RRP  rate,  inflation,  output  gap,  Federal  funds  rate,  and  percentage 
changes in Dubai crude import prices, the real effective exchange rate index, and money 
supply.   10 
We ran a grid search on the contemporaneous and quarterly forecast horizons
8 up 
to  two  years
9  for  both  regressors  over  the  1992:01  to  2003:12  sample  period.  The 
criterion we use is the minimum standard error of regression (S.E.R.), which measures 
the dispersion of actual values of the overnight RRP rate from the fitted values. 
 
 Since we have more instruments than parameters to be estimated, we tested for 
the  validity  of  the  overidentifying  restrictions.  The  null  hypothesis  that  all  the 
overidentifying  restrictions  are  satisfied  is  comfortably  not  rejected  for  each  forecast 
profile since the associated p-values of the test are all above 0.77. This implies that we 
are not omitting some relevant explanatory variable(s) in the specification which may be 
correlated with our set of instruments that would, if it were instead true, lead to the 
violation of our imposed orthogonality condition and a statistical rejection of the model. 
Initially  and  over  the  sample  studied,  this  belies  the  relevance  of  controlling  money 
supply growth and stabilizing the exchange rate as additional concerns of the BSP. 
 
With careful examination, we see in Table 2 that, rather than in the reverse, the 
coefficient estimates are more stable across target profiles when the target horizon for 
inflation is held constant while the target horizon for the output gap is allowed to vary. 
We also find in this case that the estimates of  b  are not variably changing and that it 
happens to be above unity only under inflation forecasts of one and two quarters ahead. 
Inflationary expectations away from target are thus more stable concerns of the BSP than 
output deviations from trend. 
 
The S.E.R. is at its lowest at one quarter rational forecasts of inflation and the 
output gap; we thus choose this target profile
10. In comparison, de Brouwer and Gilbert 
(2003) find that in the case of the Reserve Bank of Australia, four quarter forecasts of 
inflation  and  contemporaneous  and  one  quarter  ahead  forecasts  of  the  output  gap 
dominate other target profiles, the former in keeping with the model-based results of de 
Brouwer and Ellis (1998) that this target horizon for inflation is the most reliable for 
policy. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) casually assumed a forecast horizon of one year 
for  inflation  and  contemporaneous  for  the  output  gap  for  various  central  banks  from 
developed countries, arguing that policymakers are more likely concerned with medium 
and longer term trends in inflation. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) preferred a one 
quarter-ahead forecast profile for targeting the Federal funds rate even if they show that it 
was not qualitatively different from what they observe as more realistic target horizons of 
n = 12 and m = 6 or 12, in line with allowances for lags in the effect of monetary policy 
actions. Our interpretation here is that this relatively short target horizon for the BSP 
reflects  the  susceptibility  of  the  Philippine  economy  to  various  internal  and  external 
shocks and may be indicative of less mature markets and institutions. 
                                                 
8 We use quarterly forecast horizons because data on real GDP come out every quarter and it is 
conceivable that policymakers anticipate economic variables over the succeeding quarters rather than over 
the following months. 
9 The BSP formally adopts a two-year inflation targeting horizon. 
10 We tried using monthly forecast horizons and arrived at a forecast profile of n = 2 and m = 2 with 
an implied inflation target equal to 6.33%, just below the sample mean of inflation. The other parameter 
estimates are not much different from that of the forecast profile we adopt, though the coefficient on the 
output gap is insignificant.   11 
Table 2. Baseline specification, whole sample estimation 
 
n m ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ p-value S.E.R.
0 0 1.88 0.94 -0.03 0.65 0.9683 3.2545
(6.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.02)
0 3 6.16 0.87 -0.08 0.64 0.9264 3.2812
(1.33) (0.08) (0.15) (0.02)
0 6 6.46 0.82 -0.02 0.64 0.9502 3.3195
(1.02) (0.08) (0.15) (0.02)
0 9 6.15 0.80 -0.51 0.59 0.9755 3.3116
(1.00) (0.06) (0.16) (0.02)
0 12 6.85 0.87 -0.91 0.55 0.8860 3.3024
(1.73) (0.08) (0.16) (0.02)
0 15 8.35 0.87 -0.92 0.56 0.9206 3.3308
(1.56) (0.07) (0.11) (0.02)
0 18 8.91 0.90 -1.21 0.54 0.9049 3.3845
(2.50) (0.05) (0.09) (0.02)
0 21 6.88 0.76 -0.71 0.60 0.9831 3.4607
(1.02) (0.07) (0.12) (0.02)
0 24 6.83 0.73 -0.68 0.61 0.9909 3.5307
(1.06) (0.10) (0.15) (0.02)
3 0 4.78 1.14 -0.22 0.59 0.9177 3.2404
(0.66) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01)
3 3 4.68 1.13 -0.26 0.58 0.9058 3.2374
(0.87) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01)
3 6 4.00 1.13 -0.14 0.59 0.8825 3.2741
(0.94) (0.05) (0.11) (0.02)
3 9 -2.52 1.03 -0.51 0.57 0.9248 3.2730
(14.77) (0.06) (0.14) (0.02)
3 12 1.10 1.06 -0.72 0.55 0.9322 3.2817
(6.40) (0.07) (0.18) (0.02)
3 15 0.15 1.06 -0.87 0.54 0.9095 3.3055
(6.61) (0.06) (0.11) (0.02)
3 18 1.89 1.11 -1.17 0.53 0.9074 3.3440
(2.49) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02)
3 21 0.70 1.08 -0.91 0.56 0.9054 3.3882
(3.36) (0.05) (0.12) (0.01)
3 24 14.55 0.96 -0.78 0.58 0.9437 3.4694
(15.47) (0.07) (0.12) (0.02)
6 0 3.48 1.18 -0.33 0.61 0.8250 3.3031
(0.72) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01)
6 3 3.07 1.15 -0.18 0.62 0.8212 3.3045
(0.94) (0.05) (0.12) (0.01)
6 6 3.15 1.17 -0.09 0.62 0.8716 3.3083
(0.91) (0.05) (0.11) (0.01)
6 9 -3.73 1.05 -0.47 0.61 0.9074 3.3131
(14.27) (0.08) (0.12) (0.02)
6 12 63.42 0.99 -0.79 0.58 0.8529 3.3249
(407.20) (0.08) (0.17) (0.02)
6 15 27.90 0.97 -0.63 0.60 0.8845 3.3649
(67.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.01)
6 18 -235.65 1.00 -0.95 0.58 0.7757 3.4039
(6650.72) (0.08) (0.10) (0.01)
6 21 20.62 0.96 -0.84 0.61 0.9708 3.4364
(23.41) (0.06) (0.10) (0.01)
6 24 13.06 0.89 -0.91 0.60 0.9373 3.4886
(3.62) (0.05) (0.13) (0.01)
Bold typeface indicates significance at the 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.   12 
 (continuation of Table 2) 
 
n m ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ p-value S.E.R.
9 0 8.14 0.91 -0.49 0.66 0.9331 3.3927
(2.87) (0.06) (0.12) (0.01)
9 3 9.71 0.92 -0.47 0.66 0.9112 3.3920
(3.74) (0.06) (0.14) (0.01)
9 6 7.99 0.87 -0.04 0.68 0.9460 3.4054
(2.52) (0.07) (0.16) (0.01)
9 9 8.93 0.91 -0.58 0.65 0.9639 3.3815
(3.47) (0.08) (0.15) (0.02)
9 12 8.64 0.81 -0.61 0.66 0.9455 3.3994
(1.71) (0.13) (0.27) (0.02)
9 15 7.11 0.69 -0.52 0.66 0.9512 3.4435
(1.02) (0.11) (0.19) (0.02)
9 18 7.65 0.58 -0.70 0.65 0.9228 3.4732
(0.74) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02)
9 21 8.18 0.61 -0.49 0.65 0.9601 3.5177
(0.64) (0.10) (0.21) (0.01)
9 24 8.18 0.56 -0.69 0.64 0.9752 3.5567
(0.52) (0.12) (0.19) (0.01)
12 0 8.67 0.74 -0.81 0.65 0.8497 3.4249
(0.82) (0.08) (0.12) (0.01)
12 3 7.66 0.70 -0.86 0.65 0.8983 3.4251
(0.64) (0.08) (0.12) (0.01)
12 6 7.82 0.60 -0.42 0.66 0.8807 3.4313
(0.61) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01)
12 9 7.47 0.59 -0.74 0.65 0.8883 3.4069
(0.60) (0.08) (0.20) (0.02)
12 12 7.81 0.49 -1.06 0.62 0.8771 3.3824
(0.57) (0.12) (0.19) (0.02)
12 15 7.68 0.39 -0.77 0.65 0.8643 3.4270
(0.44) (0.12) (0.16) (0.01)
12 18 7.88 0.36 -0.78 0.65 0.9169 3.4761
(0.36) (0.13) (0.14) (0.02)
12 21 8.12 0.33 -0.58 0.64 0.8640 3.5141
(0.42) (0.12) (0.22) (0.01)
12 24 7.95 0.16 -0.77 0.63 0.9284 3.5569
(0.31) (0.12) (0.20) (0.01)
15 0 7.40 0.31 -0.61 0.67 0.8859 3.4655
(0.32) (0.12) (0.17) (0.01)
15 3 7.62 0.40 -0.96 0.64 0.8474 3.4496
(0.27) (0.10) (0.16) (0.01)
15 6 7.30 0.20 -0.54 0.66 0.9015 3.4660
(0.27) (0.11) (0.17) (0.01)
15 9 7.41 0.25 -0.73 0.64 0.8725 3.4356
(0.28) (0.09) (0.19) (0.01)
15 12 7.33 0.17 -1.03 0.64 0.8676 3.4213
(0.32) (0.09) (0.22) (0.02)
15 15 7.31 0.11 -0.95 0.65 0.8762 3.4276
(0.28) (0.09) (0.15) (0.01)
15 18 7.48 0.06 -0.95 0.66 0.8994 3.4790
(0.26) (0.11) (0.13) (0.02)
15 21 7.55 0.00 -0.61 0.65 0.8861 3.5213
(0.28) (0.10) (0.21) (0.01)
15 24 7.61 -0.01 -0.66 0.64 0.9480 3.5652
(0.28) (0.09) (0.22) (0.01)
Bold typeface indicates significance at the 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.   13 
(continuation of Table 2) 
 
n m ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ p-value S.E.R.
18 0 7.77 0.46 -0.63 0.64 0.9088 3.4629
(0.47) (0.09) (0.16) (0.02)
18 3 8.02 0.56 -1.06 0.61 0.8887 3.4380
(0.48) (0.07) (0.13) (0.02)
18 6 7.60 0.43 -0.81 0.63 0.8952 3.4504
(0.44) (0.10) (0.18) (0.02)
18 9 7.84 0.48 -1.01 0.60 0.8809 3.4059
(0.44) (0.09) (0.16) (0.02)
18 12 8.01 0.41 -1.18 0.60 0.8515 3.4051
(0.48) (0.08) (0.19) (0.02)
18 15 7.93 0.36 -0.97 0.63 0.8571 3.4293
(0.41) (0.07) (0.15) (0.01)
18 18 8.02 0.32 -0.94 0.63 0.8655 3.4480
(0.39) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01)
18 21 7.88 0.28 -0.67 0.63 0.8802 3.4913
(0.39) (0.09) (0.22) (0.01)
18 24 8.39 0.29 -0.67 0.61 0.8688 3.5347
(0.37) (0.09) (0.22) (0.01)
21 0 8.62 0.67 -0.79 0.61 0.9248 3.4782
(0.99) (0.08) (0.16) (0.02)
21 3 8.31 0.64 -0.96 0.60 0.9412 3.4572
(0.76) (0.06) (0.14) (0.02)
21 6 8.53 0.68 -0.89 0.59 0.9214 3.4496
(0.96) (0.08) (0.19) (0.02)
21 9 10.19 0.74 -1.06 0.55 0.8714 3.3757
(0.96) (0.06) (0.14) (0.02)
21 12 10.21 0.71 -1.20 0.55 0.8570 3.3855
(1.26) (0.07) (0.16) (0.02)
21 15 9.28 0.64 -0.89 0.59 0.8810 3.4273
(0.75) (0.06) (0.15) (0.02)
21 18 9.62 0.60 -0.92 0.59 0.8327 3.4600
(0.86) (0.07) (0.15) (0.02)
21 21 8.46 0.52 -0.56 0.62 0.9086 3.4708
(0.70) (0.10) (0.21) (0.02)
21 24 9.40 0.57 -0.62 0.60 0.8803 3.5149
(0.75) (0.09) (0.20) (0.01)
24 0 9.13 0.60 -0.53 0.62 0.9047 3.5428
(0.71) (0.06) (0.18) (0.01)
24 3 8.03 0.60 -0.97 0.60 0.9681 3.5350
(0.65) (0.06) (0.14) (0.01)
24 6 8.35 0.63 -0.85 0.59 0.9429 3.5255
(0.84) (0.07) (0.16) (0.01)
24 9 9.45 0.72 -1.16 0.55 0.9367 3.4444
(0.91) (0.06) (0.11) (0.01)
24 12 10.99 0.74 -1.40 0.50 0.8547 3.4194
(1.20) (0.06) (0.15) (0.02)
24 15 10.48 0.69 -1.13 0.54 0.8800 3.4688
(0.62) (0.05) (0.11) (0.01)
24 18 9.90 0.63 -1.15 0.55 0.8879 3.5205
(0.46) (0.04) (0.13) (0.01)
24 21 9.01 0.54 -0.77 0.60 0.9092 3.5256
(0.63) (0.08) (0.16) (0.01)
24 24 9.43 0.59 -0.69 0.61 0.9243 3.5421
(0.60) (0.07) (0.20) (0.02)
Bold typeface indicates significance at the 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.   14 
All  the  coefficient  estimates  are  highly  significant,  with  the  estimate  of  r  
suggesting moderate interest rate inertia of nearly 60%. The implied inflation target is 
4.68% and is within the range of most recently published inflation targets of the BSP and 
the government, though we note that this estimate seems to be rather unstable across 
different target profiles, unlike that of the smoothing parameter. The corresponding 99% 
confidence interval for the implied inflation target is [2.97%, 6.39%]. 
 
We  obtain  a  b   that  is  significantly  above  unity  here,  implying  that  the  BSP 
responds  effectively  enough  to  curb  inflation  and  prevent  the  real  interest  rate  from 
falling whenever inflationary expectations one-quarter ahead are above target. However, 
since  this  result  is  contingent  on  the  target  profile  that  we  adopt,  and  indeed  in  the 
majority of cases b  is lower than unity, we are not very confident in this result. 
 
We find that a  is significantly negative, and thus we have a curious mix where  
the BSP is stabilizing expected inflation but accommodating the expected one-quarter 
ahead output gap, impervious to the inflationary pressure this would later on exert. This 
estimate is rather convincing given that all the other target profiles have this same sign. 
 
These  observations  on  the  primary  coefficients  of  interest  may  indeed  be 
illumined by checking if the coefficient estimates are consistent within sub-periods in our 
sample. We include dummies in (6) corresponding to the periods covered by the three 
monetary policy frameworks adopted by the BSP during our sample. We interpret these 
estimates with caution since we are in effect further trimming what is already a rather 
short sample. 
 
We now see in the upper part of Table 3 that there have been distinctive changes 
in all the parameter estimates, most notable of which is for  b , significantly above unity 
only in periods I and III. The coefficient on the output gap is very negative in period I but 
not  significantly  so  in  period  III  and  even  moderately  positive  in  period  II.  Taken 
together, these estimates broadly suggest that monetary authorities were bent on reining 
in on inflation in period I, probably because it had to meet the hard inflation targets that 
went with the IMF loan program, to the extent that it had to sacrifice stabilizing the 
output gap. which was negative all throughout this period. The estimates for period II 
show  an  accommodative  stance  to  inflationary  expectations  as  expected,  resulting  in 
higher inflation with pronounced swings, though the modest concern for the output gap 
held this in check. The shift to inflation targeting in period III was indeed accompanied 
by  strong  responses  to  inflationary  pressures  and  an  apparent  disregard  of  output 
deviations from trend. 
 
The implied inflation targets are declining across time, consistent with increased 
concern over price stability, with the estimate for period III not significantly different 
from 4%, the lower end of the BSP’s most recent inflation target. We note though that 
unreliable implied inflation rate targets are more likely the casualty in this exercise, in as 
much as 
* p  interacts with  b  in a  and that it is contingent on the particular long-run 
equilibrium real interest rate that we use. We still see hints of interest rate smoothing, and   15 
even though the estimate of  r  for period III is rather explosive, we find that it is not 
significantly  different  from  unity.  This  is  consistent  with  the  noticeable  stasis  in  the 
overnight RRP rate during this period. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of subsample estimates 
and testing for forward-looking behavior 
￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ p-value S.E.R.
Baseline specification
I 11.02 2.37 -4.02 0.51 0.9746 3.2681
(0.63) (0.25) (0.47) (0.02)
II 6.93 0.62 0.36 0.33
(0.58) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
III 2.96 1.83 -1.10 1.26
(0.75) (0.36) (1.01) (0.18)
Backward-looking specification
I 6.58 1.33 -0.98 0.55 0.9644 3.2370
(3.46) (0.34) (0.45) (0.02)
II 4.27 0.76 0.58 0.44
(2.88) (0.14) (0.16) (0.09)
III 3.11 -1.29 -0.01 0.89
(0.64) (2.69) (2.23) (0.14)
Lagged inflation added to baseline specification
I 8.33 2.53 -4.56 0.50 -0.53 0.9794 3.3298
(1.65) (0.39) (0.57) (0.03) (0.26)
II 9.85 0.64 0.32 0.31 -0.12
(3.93) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.16)
III 14.45 1.19 -0.33 1.40 0.63
(32.90) (0.45) (0.75) (0.23) (0.50)
Bold typeface indicates significance at the 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.  
 
We compute for the implied interest rate target from our baseline specifications 
and plot it together with the overnight RRP rate in Figure 4. We observe that the interest 
rate  target  series  recovered  from  the  whole  sample  estimation  does  a  good  job  of 
capturing the broad movements in the overnight RRP rate, while the one recovered from 
the subsample estimation is more pronounced and follows the actual policy rate more 
closely,  with  the  possible  exception  of  period  III
11.  This  is  supported  by  correlation 
coefficients, measured on the whole sample and by sub-periods, presented in the upper 
part of Table 4. On the other hand, plotting the two rate target series with inflation in 
Figure 5 shows that the interest rate target recovered from the whole sample estimation 
merely mimics the movement of inflation, albeit at an evident lead. Here we see that the 
rate target series recovered from estimation by sub-periods is not as responsive to the 
                                                 
11 Both rate targets belatedly anticipate the hike in the actual rate on March 1995 and are noticeably 
higher  until  the  end  of  1995.  We  suspect  that  this  may  be  caused  by  an  indistinct  transition  or  an 
imprecisely dated breakpoint, which we cannot distinguish a priori.   16 
inflation swings of period II as the other rate target series is, though this is probably in 
keeping with the apparent accommodative stance taken by the BSP during this interim. 
We thus suppose that the baseline specification estimated by sub-periods responds more 
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Table 4. Correlation between the overnight RRP rate 
and implied interest rate targets 
Sample: I II III
Baseline specification
Whole sample estimation 0.5217 0.2908 0.2913 0.8884
Subsample estimation 0.6037 0.4115 0.3848 0.8687
Backward-looking specification
Whole sample estimation 0.4899 0.2880 0.2262 0.6042
Subsample estimation 0.5494 0.4157 0.4286 -0.6017
Lagged inflation added to baseline specification
Whole sample estimation 0.5240 0.2975 0.2938 0.8862
Subsample estimation 0.6067 0.3865 0.3694 0.8453
 
 
With regards to the sensible point that there are other monetary policy instruments 
available to the BSP that it may take advantage of in deference to using the overnight 
RRP rate, we further find that the interest rate target series estimated by sub-periods 
indeed catches some of those occasions. One such case is the substantial 3% reduction in 
reserve requirements on August 15, 1994, the biggest in a series of cuts and marked by a 
broken line in Figure 5, which seems to have been captured by the dip in the implied rate 
target series.  
 
In another significant event, the BSP introduced on January 17, 2002 a three-tier 
sliding rate schedule for banks’ overnight RRP placements, coincident with a 2% cut in 
the liquidity reserve requirement, that was lifted on March 19, 2003 and immediately 
followed by a 1% hike in the same liquidity reserve requirement. This tiering scheme was 
shortly restored from June 15, 2003 until August 28, 2003. The timing of these two 
events is illustrated as shaded areas in Figure 4. We see that these two monetary policy 
actions were largely depicted by movements in the interest rate target series, noting that 
the actual (initial tier) policy rates hardly moved. 
 
We  now  try  to  verify  if  the  forward-looking  assumption  we  made  is  indeed 
reasonable. We first estimate a backward-looking version of the baseline specification 
with the immediate lag of inflation and the one quarter lag of the output gap used instead 
of our chosen target profile. We then reestimate the original baseline specification but 
now include an additional term in the reaction function, the immediate lag of inflation, 
meant to see if this added variable significantly affects the coefficient estimates.    18 
Table 5. Testing for forward-looking behavior, whole sample estimation 
￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ p-value S.E.R.
Baseline specification
4.68 1.13 -0.26 0.58 0.9058 3.2374
(0.87) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01)
Backward-looking specification
0.80 0.93 -0.06 0.64 0.9836 3.2878
(6.66) (0.07) (0.09) (0.02)
Lagged inflation added to baseline specification
7.88 1.08 -0.24 0.59 0.04 0.9091 3.2478
(9.60) (0.10) (0.11) (0.02) (0.08)
Bold indicates significance at the 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Tables  5  and  3  feature  a  comparison  of  the  resulting  estimates  for  the  whole 
sample and by sub-periods. We simply note that we get noisier coefficient estimates in 
the  backward-looking  versions  and  that  the  estimates  of  , , and  b g r   in  the  forward-
looking specifications that included lagged inflation did not differ too much from the 
baseline specifications. Moreover, we observe that in the whole sample estimation lagged 
inflation is positive yet insignificant, but turning to the estimation by sub-periods we find 
that this was significant in period I, though the unexpected negative sign may be related 
to  the  increase  in  the  corresponding  b   estimate,  similar  to  the  decreases  in  b   that 
accompany the positive estimates of q  in the whole sample and in period III. 
 
We recover the implied interest rate target series and plot it in Figures 6 and 7. 
We do not include the baseline versions because they are very similar to that of the 
specifications with lagged inflation included in the reaction function, indicated by more 
or less similar correlation coefficients vis-à-vis the overnight RRP rate in Table 4 and 
confirmed by comparative correlations of 0.9997 for the whole sample estimation and 
0.9737 for the estimation by sub-periods. We however see significant departures from the 
baseline  versions  for  the  backward-looking  specifications,  with  the  rate  target  series 
derived from the whole sample estimation exhibiting a clear lag and uniformly lower 
correlations with the overnight RRP rate. We find a similar lag for the rate target series 
recovered from the subsample estimates in period I until the first half of period II and 
completely opposite turns in period III, with a correlation coefficient of -0.60. These plots 
and correlation coefficients by and large lend support to our forward-looking assumption, 
especially for the latter periods. We differ in this result from Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(2000) who find that a backward-looking specification performs just as well as a forward-
looking one for the US Federal Reserve, though this may well be a case of rather well-
behaved inflationary expectations
12. 
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We now try to see if the parameter estimates will be significantly affected by the 
inclusion of other variables that may also be monitored and responded to by monetary 
authorities, not necessarily in connection with the information they contain about future 
output and inflation. We individually include the contemporaneous values of the monthly 
percentage change of the real effective exchange rate index, the Federal funds rate, and   20 
money supply growth in the baseline specification
13. Gochoco-Bautista (2001) argues 
that exchange rate stabilization appears to be an important concern of the BSP, while 
some authors argue that there is a certain “herd” behavior involved in the setting of 
interest rates, anchored on the largest economy, the United States. In turn, money supply 
growth is the primary channel by which monetarists control inflation. 
 
In Table 6 it is apparent that the parameter estimates changed little if indeed they 
did, except for the noisier estimates of 
* p . The coefficient estimates of the new variables 
included are practically insignificant, although the standard errors are much lower for the 
REER index and money supply growth. What this may imply is that monetary authorities 
are unperturbed by changes in such variables per se, apart from the information they 
contain about the inflation outlook and on a whole sample basis at least. What remains to 
be seen however is whether this robustness with respect to these particular omissions is 
borne within sample. 
 
Table 6. Testing for significance of other variables, 
whole sample estimation 
￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ p-value S.E.R.
Baseline specification
4.68 1.13 -0.26 0.58 0.9058 3.2374
(0.87) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01)
Money supply growth added to baseline specification
7.10 1.16 -0.26 0.58 0.02 0.9396 3.2516
(1.54) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02)
Percentage change in the REER index added to baseline specification
4.51 1.11 -0.25 0.58 0.04 0.8967 3.2527
(1.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.01) (0.03)
Federal funds rate added to baseline specification
4.71 1.14 -0.37 0.58 -0.02 0.9740 3.2488
(4.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.02) (0.14)
Bold typeface indicates significance at the 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.  
 
We  explore  the  possibility  of  sustained  money  supply  growth  and  the 
contemporaneous  change  in  the  REER  index  being  additional  drivers  of  the  BSP’s 
monetary policy by sub-periods and present the relevant comparisons in Table 7. We still 
find stable point estimates for  b  and g  with respect to its sign and significance, though 
the coefficient on expected inflation for period III is now only significant at the 10% 
level when we include money supply growth in the reaction function. The changes in 
                                                 
13 Comparison of the S.E.R. for the different quarterly target profiles of inflation and the output gap 
when the REER index, the Federal funds rate, and money supply growth were individually included in the 
whole sample estimation of the baseline specification affirmed the selection of three months for both n and 
m.   21 
magnitude of the parameter estimates from those of the baseline specification are largely 
within the overlap of applicable confidence intervals
14. 
 
Table 7. Testing for significance of other variables,  
subsample estimation  
￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ p-value S.E.R.
Baseline specification
I 11.02 2.37 -4.02 0.51 0.9746 3.2681
(0.63) (0.25) (0.47) (0.02)
II 6.93 0.62 0.36 0.33
(0.58) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
III 2.96 1.83 -1.10 1.26
(0.75) (0.36) (1.01) (0.18)
Money supply growth added to baseline specification
I 8.37 2.79 -3.52 0.51 -0.15 0.9090 3.3275
(1.00) (0.32) (0.52) (0.03) (0.09)
II 11.52 0.43 0.54 0.16 -0.12
(1.01) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03)
III 2.62 2.57 -0.54 1.17 -0.07
(0.77) (1.52) (1.36) (0.21) (0.10)
Percentage change in the REER index added to baseline specification
I 10.40 2.66 -4.22 0.51 -0.54 0.9606 3.3137
(0.71) (0.38) (0.57) (0.03) (0.14)
II 7.05 0.63 0.34 0.27 -0.01
(0.53) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04)
III 2.83 1.90 -0.34 1.29 0.28
(0.81) (0.40) (0.91) (0.20) (0.38)
Bold typeface indicates significance at the 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.  
 
The implied inflation targets are also stable with the inclusion of the change in the 
REER index but only for period III in the other specification. The point estimates of the 
smoothing parameter are rather still high in period III for both, though values lower than 
unity are still not rejected.  
 
We obtain significant estimates of  q  only in period I for the REER index and 
only in period II for money supply growth. The sign of  q  referring to money supply 
growth is negative in all three sub-periods, suggesting a more probable accommodative 
stance towards the M1 monetary aggregate, contrary to the prescription of the traditional 
monetarist policy framework formally adopted by the BSP for so long. The insignificance 
                                                 
14 We also conducted Wald tests of equivalence between the coefficients of different sub-periods to 
check on between-subsample stability of estimates, though we have assumed outright that the three sub-
periods  we  have  defined  are  sufficiently  distinct  from  one  another.  We  did  obtain  a  number  of 
equivalencies, however, for our particular sample, we did not deem this exercise as informative since we 
ended up with interest rate targets that were very much identical to those we report here after applying the 
resulting restrictions.   22 
of  the  coefficient  on  the  REER  index  in  periods  II  and  III  roughly  indicates  the 
abandonment  by  the  BSP  of  its  widely-believed  practice  of  foreign  exchange  market 
intervention to strengthen the local currency. 
 
The coefficient estimate for the contemporaneous monthly percentage change in 
the REER index is strongly negative in period I and is an overwhelming evidence of 
exchange rate stabilization during this time. Looking at the monthly movements of the 
trade-weighted REER index and the nominal peso-dollar exchange rate in Figure 8, we 
see that the nominal exchange rate moved rather narrowly during period I, in tune with 
conventional belief that it was effectively pegged before mid-1997. The episodes of real 
currency depreciation depicted by shaded areas in Figure 8 indeed coincided with abrupt 
hikes in the overnight RRP rate. We notice that no similar episodes occurred after mid-
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  With regards to money supply growth, the slightly negative coefficient in period 
II affirms the passive stance taken by the BSP during this period, together with a weak 
response to inflationary expectations. The overnight RRP rate was indeed not sufficiently 
raised in the first half of period II even if Figure 9 depicts sustained M1 growth during 
this  time.  The  negative  output  gap  in  the  second  half  of  period  II  coincided  with  a 
downward trend in the policy rate which may explain the positive g  estimate. 
 
  It  may  well  be  said  that  the  adoption  of  the  inflation  targeting  framework  in 
period III has resulted in a more consistent aversion to inflation, as embodied in the 
computed  b  estimate, to the exclusion of other concerns, though the purported slack in 
the economy after the Asian financial crisis may well be the primary reason for tamer 
inflation. Although the coefficient on the output gap is not significant in this period, the   23 
point estimate is nevertheless consistently negative, indicative of accommodation, which 












1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Overnight RRP rate
Money Supply growth, MA(3)
Output Gap
 
  We now plot the implied interest rate target series for the subsample estimation of 
the two specifications in Figure 10. We exclude the derived series for the whole sample 
estimation because it is very much similar to that of the baseline specification, proof of 
which are the similar correlation coefficients vis-à-vis the overnight RRP rate presented 
in Table 8 and comparative correlation values above 0.9975, rightly so given that we 
found the included variables insignificant. We note that the rate target series from the 
baseline estimation by sub-periods is also very similar to the two expanded specifications 
with correlation values above 0.9745.  
 
We observe that some abrupt overnight RRP rate movements, depicted by shaded 
areas  in  Figure  10,  were  not  captured  by  the  implied  interest  rate  target  series,  thus 
qualifying as exogenous interest rate shocks. We attribute the sharp upturns in the second 
half of 1992 as brought about by market concerns on the ensuing energy crisis, that in 
mid-1997 as the response to the currency speculation that ensued after the devaluation of 
the Thai baht (an action that was not sustained given the inevitabilities of the situation), 
and the uptick in August and September 1998 as reactions to the political issue of that 
time  (President  Estrada’s  willingness  to  allow  the  burial  of  President  Marcos  at  the 
National  Heroes’  Cemetery).  Note  that  this  was  not  the  case  during  the  political 
uncertainty  that  hovered  around  the  country  from  mid-2000  to  early  2001,  with  the 
situation now in reverse, the overnight RRP rate being lower than target. A possible 
explanation is that the rate target series are picking up concerns over the pump-priming 
activities done by the government starting mid-1999, evident in the rise of money supply 
growth, which was already resulting in higher inflation. The actual rates dovetail with the 
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Table 8. Correlation between the overnight RRP rate  
and implied interest rate targets 
Sample: I II III
Baseline specification
Whole sample estimation 0.5217 0.2908 0.2913 0.8884
Subsample estimation 0.6037 0.4115 0.3848 0.8687
Money supply growth added to baseline specification
Whole sample estimation 0.5192 0.2685 0.2839 0.8824
Subsample estimation 0.5820 0.4160 0.4759 0.8821
Percentage change in the REER index added to baseline specification
Whole sample estimation 0.5188 0.2865 0.2827 0.8846
Subsample estimation 0.6014 0.4053 0.3868 0.8630
 
 
  Given this robustness of results and the intuitive interest rate targets implied by 
our  model,  we  find  generous  empirical  support  for  interest  rate  targeting  as  a 
demonstrative instrument of monetary policy for the BSP even during periods when the 
monetary policy framework in place was different from inflation targeting.  
    
However, as Svensson (2001) argues, given the simple and mechanical nature of 
the rule we estimate and the wider information set available to monetary authorities, 
situations do arise in practice when deviations from such a rule are indeed called for or 
are at least reasonable. In fact, he notes that no central bank has ever bound itself to such 
an explicit interest rate targeting rule, protective of its right to exercise discretion and   25 
reflecting the availability of other policy instruments it can put to use towards achieving 
its  goal.  The  good  empirical  fit  that  we  obtain  may  after  all  be  consistent  with  the 
reaction function being a reduced-form version of a complex and elaborate decision-
making  process.  It  is  in  this  regard  that  we  consider  our  results  as  rule-of-thumb 
estimates, in that on the average, it is sufficient to look at the near-term inflation and 
output gap outlook to predict movements in the key policy rate that go hand-in-hand with 
the monetary policy stance. 
 
We hasten to add, however, that we do not say here that other policy instruments 
are  irrelevant  or  even  unimportant  with  respect  to  determining  the  monetary  policy 
stance; we are simply acknowledging the representative character of overnight RRP rate 
adjustments for monetary policy given a near-term forecast horizon. This is important to 
note given that monetary aggregate targeting works at a considerable lag of at least a 
year, and thus the target profile that we have adopted may be inhospitable to finding the 
significance of this alternative, if not joint, policy lever.  
 
Moreover, it may well be the case that the model we use is particularly suited to 
developed countries which use interest rate setting as the primary policy tool
15, due to the 
presence of likewise developed markets, financial most importantly, and stable economic 
relationships that in turn lead to stable expectations of future economic outcomes. Thus, 
even if we get intuitive results here, it does not preclude the existence of a more apt 





5  Conclusion 
 
  We  find  support  in  this  paper  for  characterizing  monetary  policy  in  the 
Philippines  by  its  central  bank’s  (BSP)  interest  rate  setting  behavior.  The  relevant 
forecast horizon we obtain is rather short at one quarter, which may be indicative of less 
mature markets and the susceptibility of the economy to various shocks. This forward-
looking behavior is demonstrated more convincingly in recent periods. 
 
During  the  sample  period  studied,  the  monetary  response  to  inflationary 
expectations away from target was observed to be stabilizing, though a subsequent sub-
period analysis points to a rather accommodative stance practiced in the interim, prior to 
the adoption of the inflation targeting framework.  
 
In contrast, the output gap is largely accommodated by the BSP, though this result 
is strongest in earlier periods and even slightly reversed in the interim. 
                                                 
15 Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) find this true for the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan, and 
demonstrate  that  even  though  the  Bundesbank  has  been  claiming  the  practice  of  monetary  aggregate 
targeting, its interest rate setting behavior has been more reflective of its avowed monetary policy stance. 
16 Svensson (2001) indicates that similar exercises in the literature like ours have explained at best 
two-thirds of the interbank lending rate movements. We note that the adjusted R
2 of both our baseline 
specifications and its extensions have been just above 0.50.   26 
The  real  effective  exchange  rate,  Federal  funds  rate,  and  money  supply  (M1) 
growth per se are not significant concerns of the BSP on the whole relative to the near-
term outlook on inflation and the output gap, though subsample analysis hints to the 
conduct of exchange rate stabilization from 1992 to mid-1995 and then money supply 
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